Series Compensation, Power Swings, and Inverter-Based Sources and Their Impact on Line Current Differential Protection

Yiyan Xue  
*American Electric Power*

Bogdan Kasztenny, Douglas Taylor, and Yu Xia  
*Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc.*

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Series Compensation, Power Swings, and Inverter-Based Sources and Their Impact on Line Current Differential Protection

Yiyan Xue, American Electric Power
Bogdan Kasztenny, Douglas Taylor, and Yu Xia, Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc.

Abstract—It is common knowledge that the line current differential protection principle is not susceptible to unusual system conditions. This is true and straightforward regarding protection security but is not immediately obvious when considering dependability of protection. As a result of dismissing the impact of unusual system conditions, the effect of series compensation, power swings, and inverter-based short-circuit current sources on line current differential protection is not well understood.

This paper briefly touches on protection security but focuses on the dependability of line current differential protection under a number of specific system conditions, including series compensation, power swings and off-nominal frequency, and inverter-based sources. This paper reviews the impact of each of the mentioned conditions and provides illustrations using simulations.

I. INTRODUCTION

The current differential principle is a powerful short-circuit protection method. Responding to all currents bounding the zone of protection, the principle has a very high potential for both sensitivity (effectively, it sees the total fault current at the fault location) and security (effectively, it sees an external fault current flowing in and out of the protection zone). Also, differential protection is typically easy to apply because it does not require elaborate short-circuit studies and settings calculations.

In its application to power lines, the line current differential (87L) principle is typically not affected by series compensation, changing short-circuit levels, current inversion, power swings, nonstandard short-circuit current sources, and other issues that may cause problems for single-ended protection techniques (protection based on measurements from a single line terminal) [1]. These advantages, combined with the increasing availability of long-haul, utility-grade digital communications channels, such as direct fiber or synchronous optical network (SONET) networks, accelerate the rate of new 87L installations.

This paper discusses several special power system operating conditions and their impact on 87L protection. After discussing line protection security and dependability in general terms (Section II), we focus this paper on the dependability of 87L protection, including sensitivity in series-compensated lines (Section III), under power swings and frequency excursions (Section IV), and when applied near inverter-based sources (Section V).

This paper promotes the application of phase, ground, and negative-sequence differential elements [2] in parallel with addressing dependability concerns during these demanding conditions. The inherent security of the differential elements, combined with their diverse responses to internal faults under unusual system conditions, is the primary reason behind our key recommendation.

II. SECURITY AND DEPENDABILITY OF 87L ELEMENTS

A. Protection Security Versus Dependability Under Stressed System Conditions

The art of protective relaying is a constant balance between the capacity to detect fault conditions in protected assets and the ability to restrain from operation in all other situations. Considered separately, dependability and security of protection are easy targets. It is the necessity to satisfy both requirements simultaneously that makes protective relaying a challenging technical field.

When taken to the level of an individual relay function (such as an impedance element) and considered from the perspective of stressed system conditions (such as a power swing), security is the prevailing concern. Historically, line protection exposed to elevated load levels or power swings has been considered the triggering point for major blackouts. Therefore, securing protection elements under unusual conditions is our primary objective. Blinders or power swing blocking elements are examples of such security measures.

Again, when considered separately from dependability, securing relays under stressed system conditions is not a difficult task. Protective relays, however, are expected to protect assets under all circumstances, including abnormal system events, and must retain a certain level of dependability at all times. A transmission line with increased load or under a swing condition may still experience a fault. Moreover, it is more likely to develop a fault due to the conductor sagging effect of overloads or the overvoltage effect of a power swing. Such faults should be detected and cleared accordingly, regardless of loads encroaching on impedance characteristics or ongoing power swings.

On one level, the issue of dependability is related to the nature of the countermeasures applied for the effects of stressed system conditions. For example, when blocking distance protection using a power swing detection element, we
should ensure that an unblocking function is built in and will operate if a fault occurs during the swing.

On a different level, the ability of protection elements to operate correctly may be challenged under severe system events, even if these functions are not purposefully inhibited for security reasons. Consider the concept of memory polarization in an impedance element: it works assuming the prefault and fault voltages do not differ considerably in phase. Therefore, it may fail to operate dependably under unstable power swings.

In general, protection elements face both security and dependability problems when pushed beyond their regular design limits. To provide protection under severe system conditions requires more sophisticated relaying methods. Such methods, in turn, are often more difficult to set and verify. Moreover, they do not provide the same high level of performance, but rather avoid impairing the protection system performance under stressed conditions.

In yet another aspect, protective relays, if made exceptionally secure under stressed and unusual system conditions, can have negative effects on the power system if no adequate system integrity protection is in place. Under the absence of remedial action schemes, loss of security in asset protection provides a crude, random in nature, and not optimal separation mechanism for the system. Protective relays remaining secure under major system events give more time for the remedial action schemes to take an optimal, preplanned, and controlled action. If this remedial action does not take place, the enhanced security of asset protection can inadvertently deteriorate the system as a whole.

B. Differential Protection Versus Single-Ended Protection

Differential elements respond to all the currents measured at all terminals of the protected line. When detecting internal faults and restraining for external faults and other events, they have access to considerably more information compared with any single-ended protection method.

Single-ended methods, such as impedance elements or overcurrent directional elements, including phase, ground, and negative-sequence elements, work on information from one terminal of the line only. Even when used in a directional comparison scheme, the protection elements need to perform correctly at each terminal for the entire scheme to work correctly.

Single-ended protection methods are impacted by unusual system configurations, such as series compensation, power swings, or nonstandard short-circuit sources. Both security and dependability can be affected. With security concerns addressed via element design (manufacturer) or application settings (user), the single-ended methods can face new dependability concerns, in addition to the initial issues arising from the difficult operating conditions in the first place.

One possible solution to the dependability challenge is to use diverse elements in parallel and count on their dependability gaps not overlapping with each other for any particular internal fault. For example, both ground directional and negative-sequence directional elements may be used in a permissive directional comparison scheme. This approach, however, can have a limited positive effect because each element operating in parallel impacts both dependability (favorably, because more elements have a chance to detect an internal fault) and security (unfavorably, because more elements have a chance to misoperate on no internal fault conditions).

Line current differential protection is, of course, a considerably better solution because it is inherently secure. Therefore, using diverse differential elements for dependability does not adversely impact security. The next subsection explains this concept in detail.

C. Security of 87L Elements

The differential principle is inherently secure—the sum of all currents around the protected line with no internal fault equals zero at all times, regardless of series compensation on the protected line or in the vicinity, power swings, open-pole conditions, short circuits fed from nonstandard sources, and so on.

Saturation of current transformers (CTs) can jeopardize the security of 87L elements, but modern line current differential relays incorporate fast and sensitive external fault detectors (EFDs) or similar countermeasures to secure the 87L elements for CT saturation without impacting the speed or sensitivity of protection [2] [3].

Sequence differential elements (zero and negative sequence) are often used in addition to phase differential elements. Typically, the sequence differential elements (87LG and 87LQ) are used for sensitivity [4]. They respond to differential signals created from the zero- and negative-sequence currents, respectively, as shown in Fig. 1. Their superb sensitivity stems from their restraining function being uninfluenced by the load current.

This advantage of reduced restraint is also a weakness when considering CT saturation. For example, under phase-to-phase external faults, the 87LG element works with zero operating and zero restraining signals. Saturation of any of the

Fig. 1. Line current differential protection scheme with phase, ground, and negative-sequence differential elements.
CTs that carry the fault current creates a spurious differential signal in the 87LG element that cannot be restrained with current. These elements, however, are made very secure by incorporating advanced EFD logic and other means in their design [2].

It is intuitively clear that applying phase, negative-, and zero-sequence elements in parallel improves protection dependability under unusual system conditions. Does it adversely impact security? It is our opinion that it does not.

As shown in Fig. 1, all three elements (87LP, 87LG, and 87LQ) operate on the same input currents (phase currents), measured with the same CTs, wiring, relay input circuitry, and communications channel. The sequence currents are derived by calculations from the phase quantities. These calculations are performed in the same microprocessor-based relay for all three elements. As a result, the 87LQ and 87LG elements do not have any additional failure modes compared to the 87LP elements, including possible communications impairments, CT issues, or relay issues [5].

Line charging current is another consideration for security. The charging current demonstrates itself as a spurious differential signal, and therefore, it can jeopardize 87L security. However, there are solutions to this problem, including charging current compensation, as explained in [2] and [6].

The principle of operation for the 87LQ and 87LG elements is as secure as for the 87LP elements (assuming state-of-the-art EFD logic and charging current compensation). User settings for all three elements are straightforward, and the 87LQ and 87LG elements do not bring any additional issues or opportunities for human mistakes.

As a result, applying all three elements in parallel does not erode any security, but it enhances dependability under unusual conditions, as we show in the following sections.

### III. SERIES-COMPENSATED LINES

Series compensation allows higher power transfers, both in steady states and transiently, by reducing the effective impedance between two areas in the system. However, the negative reactance of series capacitors can create challenges for single-ended line protection by causing current or voltage inversions that can affect directional elements, reducing the apparent impedance that can cause impedance elements to overreach, and causing subsynchronous oscillations that can require long, intentional time delays in the protection elements in order to ride through. These issues have been the subject of numerous papers and have been addressed by manufacturers using various concepts [1]. The existing solutions are focused on security and typically require extensive simulations to prove settings for any particular application on, or in the vicinity of, series-compensated lines.

As explained in Section II, line current differential elements are not concerned with security when applied in conjunction with series compensation. In this section, we look at their dependability.

#### A. Series Capacitors Under Fault Conditions

With reference to Fig. 2, series capacitors are installed in each phase of the transmission line and are protected against overvoltages caused by large through currents, typically with metal oxide varistors (MOVs). The MOVs start to conduct and clamp the voltage across the capacitors when the current reaches two to three times the rated value (typically). The MOVs are further protected against thermal damage by closing a bypass breaker, should the dissipated thermal energy reach unsafe levels for the MOVs. In many installations, controllable spark gaps are installed and triggered upon fault detection in as fast as 1 millisecond in order to bypass the capacitors in all three phases, regardless of the fault type or fault current level.

![Series capacitors with MOVs, bypass breakers, and controlled spark gaps.](image)

Assuming the spark gaps are not used or before they are triggered, the MOVs control the behavior of the series capacitor installation. With the MOV voltage practically constant, the effective resistance of the MOV decreases as the current through the series capacitor installation increases. Two basic cases are worth considering: low fault currents with the MOVs not conducting at all and high fault currents with the MOV resistance being much lower than the reactance of the series capacitors (zero current through the series capacitor and all fault current through the parallel MOV).
Consider a single-line-to-ground (SLG) fault in A-phase. The impedance matrix representing the series capacitor installation can be written as (1a) for low-current faults and (1b) for high-current faults.

\[
Z_{\text{ABC}} = \begin{bmatrix}
-jX_C & 0 & 0 \\
0 & -jX_C & 0 \\
0 & 0 & -jX_C \\
\end{bmatrix} \quad (1a)
\]

\[
Z_{\text{ABC}} = \begin{bmatrix}
0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & -jX_C & 0 \\
0 & 0 & -jX_C \\
\end{bmatrix} \quad (1b)
\]

Note that there is no mutual coupling between the phases of the series capacitor installation. Under high-current asymmetrical faults, the impedances are different in different phases.

Converting phase impedances (1) into sequence impedances, we obtain (2a) for low-current faults and (2b) for high-current faults.

\[
Z_{012} = -jX_{\ast} \begin{bmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 \\
\end{bmatrix} \quad (2a)
\]

\[
Z_{012} = -jX_{\ast} \begin{bmatrix}
\frac{2}{3} & -1 & -1 \\
-1 & 2 & -1 \\
-1 & -1 & 2 \\
\end{bmatrix} \quad (2b)
\]

Equation (2a) signifies that under low-current faults, all three symmetrical networks (positive, negative, and zero sequence) contain the same capacitive reactance that is equal to the physical per-phase reactance of the capacitors. Moreover, the sequence networks remain decoupled at the series capacitor installation, allowing simple fault analysis, similar to uncompensated lines.

Equation (2b) signifies that under high-current SLG faults, each sequence network contains 2/3 of the per-phase reactance of the capacitors but the sequence networks are inductively coupled at the series capacitor installation, complicating fault analysis.

The two cases are illustrated in Fig. 3.

(a)  
(b)

Note that for the case of Fig. 3b, only 2/3 of the per-phase capacitive reactance is inserted in the sequence networks, suggesting a lesser danger of current or voltage inversion when compared with low-current faults (Fig. 3a). However, mutual coupling between the networks can complicate the situation. The following items are worth pointing out regarding high-current faults that cause the MOV to bypass the series capacitor asymmetrically:

- The positive-sequence current creates a voltage drop in the zero- and negative-sequence networks. This voltage drop affects the sequence current flows and the operating conditions for the 87LG and 87LQ elements. As a result, these elements are no longer independent from the load current.
- Because the mutual coupling is inductive, it helps prevent voltage and current inversion as long as the coupled networks do not experience current inversion themselves.
- Load current can contribute to current and voltage inversion in the sequence networks. Load current in the importing direction creates a voltage drop in the negative- and zero-sequence networks that has the same effect as a voltage drop across a capacitive element.
- Because of the mutual coupling between the sequence networks, the 87LP, 87LG, and 87LQ elements do not respond independently to fault conditions, but their responses are mutually related. The next subsection explains this point further.

We can apply a similar approach to high-current line-to-line faults. The phase and sequence impedance matrices for an AB fault are as follows:

\[
Z_{\text{ABC}} = \begin{bmatrix}
0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & -jX_C \\
\end{bmatrix} \quad (3a)
\]

\[
Z_{012} = -jX_{\ast} \begin{bmatrix}
1 & a & a^2 \\
a^2 & 1 & a \\
a & a^2 & 1 \\
\end{bmatrix} \quad , \quad a = 1\angle 120^\circ \quad (3b)
\]

In this case, only 1/3 of the per-phase capacitive reactance appears in the sequence networks. The networks are coupled, as in the case of SLG faults. To complicate things more, induced voltages are shifted 30 degrees and –210 degrees from the coupled currents. We observe the same effects as for SLG faults: impact of the load current on sequence currents, interdependence between the 87LP, 87LQ, and 87LG elements, and so on.
B. Low-Current SLG Internal Faults

First, we consider the case of a low-current SLG fault. The series capacitors are represented by the sequence networks of Fig. 3a, yielding a short-circuit equivalent network, as shown in Fig. 4. Note that the negative-sequence impedances are assumed to be equal to the positive-sequence impedances.

\[
Z_L = Z_{0L} - jX_C, \quad I_{0L} \quad (1-m) \cdot Z_0 \quad I_{0R} \quad Z_{0R}
\]

Because the sequence networks are not coupled at the series capacitor installation, we can take full advantage of the sequence components and solve the circuit of Fig. 4 for quantities relevant to the 87L elements. In particular, we are interested in the 87LG and 87LQ elements because these elements are meant to detect low-current faults [4].

For the zero-sequence network, we can write:

\[
I_{0L} (Z_{0L} - jX_C + mZ_0) = I_{0R} (Z_{0R} + (1-m)Z_0) \quad (4)
\]

We focus this paper on 87L elements based on the Alpha Plane principle [1] [2] and therefore are interested in the ratio of the currents at the line terminals. Equation (4) allows us to calculate this ratio as follows:

\[
\frac{I_{0L}}{I_{0R}} = k_0 = \frac{Z_{0R} + (1-m)Z_0}{Z_{0L} - jX_C + mZ_0} \quad (5)
\]

The Alpha Plane 87LG element operates for this internal fault if the complex ratio \( k_0 \) falls outside of the blocking characteristic depicted in Fig. 5 [1] [2].

We can perform the following simplified, but conservative, dependability analysis for the 87LG element based on (5) and the settings of Fig. 5.

For simplicity, neglect the resistance part of the system and line impedances. This assumption is justified because of a large margin between the blocking and tripping of the Alpha Plane characteristic (see Fig. 5) in terms of the angle. From (5), the Alpha Plane ratio becomes a real number (the imaginary part is small).

\[
k_0 = \frac{X_{0R} + (1-m)X_0}{X_{0L} - X_C + mX_0} \quad (6)
\]

The 87LG element will trip reliably as long as the ratio (6) is positive or, in other words, as long as the denominator is positive (i.e., the impedance between the fault and local system is inductive).

\[
x_{0L} - X_C + mX_0 > 0 \quad \text{or} \quad m > \frac{X_C - X_{0L}}{X_0} \quad (7)
\]

When (7) is not satisfied, the 87LG element can still reliably operate if the \( k_0 \) ratio is larger than the setting \( R \) or lower than 1/R (see Fig. 5).

Solving for \(|k_0| > R\) yields:

\[
m > \frac{R(X_C - X_{0L}) - (X_0 + X_{0R})}{X_0(R-1)} \quad \text{and} \quad m < \frac{X_C - X_{0L}}{X_0} \quad (8a)
\]

Solving for \(|k_0| < 1/R\) yields:

\[
m > \frac{R(X_0 + X_{0R}) - (X_C - X_{0L})}{X_0(R-1)} \quad \text{and} \quad m < \frac{X_C - X_{0L}}{X_0} \quad (8b)
\]

The 87LG element operates reliably for all low-current SLG faults located beyond the value of \( m \) given by (7) or (8), whichever is lower. Specifically:

- Condition (7) means that the 87LG element will cover the entire line as long as the series capacitance is lower than the local system reactance (no current inversion).
- Condition (8a) means the 87LG element will cover the entire line as long as the local current is considerably higher than the remote current (\( R \) times), even if there is current inversion at the local terminal.
- Condition (8b) means the 87LG element will cover the entire line as long as the remote current is considerably higher than the local current (\( R \) times), even if there is current inversion at the local terminal.

Similar analysis can be performed for the 87LQ element, yielding the following results:

\[
m > \frac{X_C - X_{1L}}{X_1} \quad (9a)
\]

\[
m > \frac{R(X_C - X_{1L}) - (X_1 + X_{1R})}{X_1(R-1)} \quad \text{and} \quad m < \frac{X_C - X_{1L}}{X_1} \quad (9b)
\]

\[
m > \frac{R(X_1 + X_{1R}) - (X_C - X_{1L})}{X_1(R-1)} \quad \text{and} \quad m < \frac{X_C - X_{1L}}{X_1} \quad (9c)
\]
Typically, system impedances will have different $X_0/X_1$ ratios, resulting in different responses of the 87LG and 87LQ elements based on (7) through (9). To illustrate this, we calculated the $k_0$ and $k_2$ values for the sample system shown in Fig. 6, as seen in Table I.

![Sample system to illustrate fault coverage of the 87LG and 87LQ elements.](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$m$ (pu)</th>
<th>Low-CURRENT SLG FAULT</th>
<th>High-CURRENT SLG FAULT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$k_0$</td>
<td>$k_2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>23.6°</td>
<td>162°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>21.5°</td>
<td>137°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>6.84°</td>
<td>5.6°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.72°</td>
<td>5.1°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.38°</td>
<td>2.9°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.63°</td>
<td>1.3°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.15°</td>
<td>0.9°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.82°</td>
<td>0.5°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.58°</td>
<td>0.6°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.4°</td>
<td>0.4°</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that the 87LQ element will only respond to faults beyond 0.13 pu in this case, but the dependability gap between 0 and 0.13 pu is covered by the 87LG element.

This analysis is valid for a series capacitor installation at the local terminal of the protected line. Similar analysis can be performed for different series capacitor locations (middle of the line and at both line terminals), as well as for capacitor locations external to the protected line.

**C. High-Current SLG Internal Faults**

Next, we consider the case of a high-current SLG fault. The series capacitors are represented by the sequence networks of Fig. 3b, giving us the short-circuit equivalent network shown in Fig. 7.

![Equivalent circuit for a high-current SLG fault.](image)

Because the sequence networks are coupled at the series capacitor installation, solving the circuit of Fig. 7 is more complicated. In this paper, we simply show that the Alpha Plane ratios $k_0$ and $k_2$ are no longer independent but are related to each other. From Fig. 7, we see:

$$I_{0L}(Z_{0L} - j\frac{1}{3}X_C + mZ_0) + j\frac{1}{3}X_C(I_{2L} + I_{1L}) = I_{10R}(Z_{0R} + (1-m)Z_0)$$  \(10\)

Note that:

$$I_{2L} + I_{1L} = I_{AL} - I_{0L}$$  \(11\)

Inserting (11) into (10) yields:

$$-j\frac{1}{3}X_CI_{AL} = I_{0L}(Z_{0L} - jX_C + mZ_0) - I_{10R}(Z_{0R} + (1-m)Z_0)$$  \(12a\)

Similarly:

$$-j\frac{1}{3}X_CI_{AL} = I_{2L}(Z_{IL} - jX_C + mZ_I) - I_{2R}(Z_{IR} + (1-m)Z_I)$$  \(12b\)
Equating (12a) and (12b) shows how the zero- and negative-sequence currents are interdependent.

\[
I_{0L}(Z_{0L} - jX_c + mZ_o) - I_{0R}(Z_{0R} + (1-m)Z_o) = I_{2L}(Z_{2L} - jX_c + mZ_t) - I_{2R}(Z_{2R} + (1-m)Z_t)
\]

(13)

From Fig. 7, we notice further that:

\[
I_{0L} + I_{0R} = I_{2L} + I_{2R}
\]

(14)

Inserting (14) into (13) and rewriting the expression of the current ratios \(k_0\) and \(k_2\) yield:

\[
1 + k_2 = \frac{(Z_{1R} + (1-m)Z_t) - k_2(Z_{1L} - jX_c + mZ_t)}{1 + k_0} = \frac{(Z_{0R} + (1-m)Z_0) - k_0(Z_{0L} - jX_c + mZ_0)}{1 + k_0}
\]

(15)

Equation (15) shows that the Alpha Plane operating points for 87LG and 87LQ are correlated and controlled by both the zero- and positive-sequence network impedances.

Table I and Fig. 8 illustrate this finding by using the sample system parameters of Fig. 6 and applying them to the case of Fig. 7.

When examining Table I, we see that for the same system and same fault locations, the values of \(k_2\) and \(k_0\) differ considerably depending on whether the fault is a low-current fault (no MOV conduction) or a high-current fault (full MOV conduction). For example, for \(m = 0.9\), \(k_2 = 2.51 \angle 9.7^\circ\) for low-current faults and \(k_2 = 0.42 \angle -74^\circ\) for high-current faults.

Note that the 87LG element covers the entire line, while the 87LQ element has a dependability gap for close-in and remote high-current faults.

When examining Fig. 8, we see that zero-sequence impedances impact the current ratio for both the 87LG and 87LQ elements. The impact of \(X_{0L}\) on \(k_2\) is quite dramatic. For low values of \(X_{0L}\), 87LQ will block, and for larger values (weaker local system), 87LQ will operate.

**D. Transient Response of 87L Elements**

The previous analysis pertains to the steady-state response of the 87L elements. Line terminal currents are, however, subject to subsynchronous oscillations due to series compensation, and the impact on transient errors due to oscillations must be considered as well.

Subsynchronous oscillations do not violate Kirchhoff’s current law. Therefore, the differential current remains very low (ideally zero) during any noninternal fault conditions, including transients. The overcurrent pickup condition of the 87L elements guarantees stability of the 87L elements, even if the Alpha Plane trajectories respond to the subsynchronous transients.

Subsynchronous transients can impact the accuracy and speed of 87L elements during internal faults by causing relatively slow changes in the differential current level or the Alpha Plane ratio. However, the high sensitivity of the 87LQ and 87LG elements means that these elements have a large operating margin, and therefore, they will be impacted only minimally by the subsynchronous oscillations.

Often, distance backup elements are used within the 87L relay to account for the loss of channel. The application of distance functions on series-compensated lines can greatly benefit from transient closed-loop scheme testing, such as using the Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS®). It is a good practice to verify the performance of the 87L elements as well during the transient testing process.

**E. Recommendations for 87L Applications**

From our analysis, it is clear that the 87L elements (87LP, 87LG, and 87LQ) experience different operating conditions for any given internal fault on series-compensated lines. In order to increase a chance for dependable relay operation and avoid blocking due to current inversion or the impact of load on sensitivity, we recommend using all three elements. This approach does not erode security, as explained in Section II.

**IV. POWER SWINGS AND OFF-NOMINAL FREQUENCY**

**A. Power Swings**

We now explore the dependability of 87L elements during power swings using a sample case of an internal ACG fault during an unstable swing. Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 present the voltages and currents measured at both terminals of the line. The fault occurs at \(t = 0\), where the currents are at the maximum of the swing envelope. The case has been obtained through simulation on a made-to-scale power system model, and the fault is removed after about 0.42 seconds, without opening any circuit breakers.
Fig. 9. Line ACG fault during an unstable power swing: phase voltages (fault applied at \( t = 0 \) seconds).

Now, we examine the performance of the sequence differential elements. Fig. 12 shows the instantaneous 3I₀ currents at both terminals of the line. Note that this current is zero before the fault and develops to considerable values during the fault. This current swings as the two systems swing against each other during the fault. This can be explained by looking at Fig. 4 (excluding the series capacitors, of course). As the two sources in the Fig. 4 diagram swing, all the currents and voltages follow the swing. However, the zero-sequence currents measured at the two line terminals still abide by the current divider principle of the zero-sequence network—the fault current swings, but it divides itself between the local and remote line terminals in a constant proportion established by the line and system zero-sequence impedances. This is clearly visible in Fig. 12. The two currents are in phase, and their ratio is constant, regardless of the changing envelope of the two 3I₀ currents. As a result, the operating point of the 87LG Alpha Plane element \( k₀ \) has a positive real part (the currents are in phase) and a constant value (the ratio does not change). Therefore, the 87LG element will operate for this fault very reliably and quickly.

Fig. 10. Line ACG fault during an unstable power swing: phase currents (fault applied at \( t = 0 \) seconds).

Fig. 11 shows currents at both ends of the line during the first few tenths of a second of the fault. The fault occurred when the currents were elevated to about two times the CT nominal values. At that time, the two electromotive sources of the equivalent systems were almost out of phase, and the fault had little impact on the values of the phase currents. We can see that the phase currents at both ends of the line remain out of phase and almost equal. A phase differential element (87LP) will restrain for this fault regardless of the operating principle used (percent differential or the Alpha Plane). After about 200 milliseconds, the currents start to displace in phase as the system continues to swing, giving the 87LP element a chance to operate for this fault.

Fig. 11. Line ACG fault during an unstable power swing: phase currents during the internal fault (fault applied at \( t = 0 \) seconds).

The same is true for a percentage restrained 87LG element. In this case, the ratio between the operating (differential) and restraining currents is constant and significant, placing the operating point deep into the operating region of the percentage restrained 87LG element.

Similar observations can be made for the negative-sequence differential element, 87LQ. Examining Fig. 4, we can see that the negative-sequence currents at both terminals of the line will also swing but will follow the current divider principle and split in a proportion dictated by the impedances in the negative-sequence network. As a result, the 3I₂ currents at both ends of the line will be in phase, despite the changing envelope of the swing. Therefore, the 87LQ element operates reliably and quickly for faults during power swings.

Will the performance of disturbance detection and external fault detection logic affect 87L dependability during power swings?

First, we examine the disturbance detection logic (87DD). The 87DD logic often monitors the zero- and negative-sequence currents for sudden changes. From Fig. 12, we can see that the 87DD logic will operate reliably in response to the
sudden change in the zero-sequence current. The 87DD logic can have trouble with the positive-sequence current as it constantly changes during the swing, but the $3I_0$ and $3I_2$ conditions will reliably assert the 87DD output on fault inception.

Second, we look at the external fault detection logic. Fig. 13 shows one possible implementation of the EFD logic that can use either instantaneous or phasor quantities. The logic uses incremental quantities (derived over a one-cycle time span) to prevent the EFD from picking up on load currents [2]. The EFD asserts when the incremental restraining signal becomes greater than some threshold value $P$ and, at the same time, the incremental differential signal remains smaller than a percentage (q factor) of the restraining signal during 3/16 of a cycle. Once the EFD picks up, it will remain in that state until the dropout timer (DPO) expires.

In order to retain high sensitivity of the 87LQ and 87LG elements, the EFD logic must not assert in response to the power swing or the internal fault that follows. Otherwise, assertion of the EFD logic would trigger extra restraining measures to secure the 87LQ and 87LG elements, typically designed for CT saturation under external faults [2]. Fig. 14 shows the A-phase restraining signal $i_{RST}$ (top of Fig. 14) and the incremental A-phase restraining signal as well as the threshold $P$ (blue line in the bottom part of Fig. 14). The incremental restraining signal is not zero because it follows the envelope of the swing. However, the changes due to a power swing are much slower than those due to a fault. Therefore, the incremental restraining signal does not rise above the threshold $P$, and the EFD logic does not assert during a power swing, thus ensuring high sensitivity of the 87LQ and 87LG elements. Note that at $t = 0$ (fault inception), the restraining signal increases, but at this point, the differential signal increases as well. Per the logic of Fig. 13, the EFD will not assert even if the restraining signal crossed the threshold line.

B. Off-Nominal Frequencies

Off-nominal frequency operation affects single-ended protection methods because it impairs measurement accuracy and creates problems for distance element memory polarization.

Sample-based 87L elements, such as those described in [3], are not concerned with off-nominal frequencies. The sample-based implementations exchange instantaneous values of the currents acquired without frequency tracking. Only after the instantaneous differential signal is formed from the local and remote currents does the relay apply frequency tracking. Without frequency tracking, the measurement errors resulting from the relay tracking to a different frequency than the signal frequency have little impact on the security and dependability of the differential function—a zero differential signal, even if measured assuming an incorrect frequency, is still zero; a significant differential signal, even if measured assuming an incorrect frequency, is still significant. In theory, these errors can impact operation for borderline cases (i.e., when the operating point is located close to the operate/restrain boundary of the 87L characteristic). But for typical cases of internal faults and other conditions (load, external fault), there is a very large margin to accommodate these minor measurement errors.

The situation can be different for phasor-based implementations. If the 87L relays exchange phasors and these relays track to different frequencies, considerable angular errors are introduced in the phasors. These errors may lead to security or dependability problems in a manner similar to issues with memory polarization for distance elements.
Therefore, it is imperative that all 87L relays of a given scheme track to the same frequency. If so, even if this frequency is off, the impact is minimal and similar as for sample-based implementations. Typically, in order to track to the same frequency, the phasor-based 87L relays measure the frequency from current phasors (these are available to all relays in the scheme) and not from voltages. This, however, results in lower accuracy of frequency tracking and exposes the tracking algorithm to extra challenges.

V. INVERTER-BASED SOURCES

We use an example of a doubly fed induction generator (DFIG) to illustrate issues when protecting lines connected to wind farms using DFIGs.

A. DFIG Components

The DFIG system shown in Fig. 15 consists of a wind turbine, gearbox, induction generator, and back-to-back voltage source converters with a dc link. The converters are dc/ac rectifiers (grid side) and ac/dc inverters (rotor side), using power electronics, such as insulated gate bipolar transistors (IGBTs). By controlling the timing and sequence of the firing of each IGBT, the frequency and amplitude of rotor currents can be adjusted to optimize the generator outputs per wind speed. The dc chopper circuit and crowbar circuit are included in the DFIG to protect the converters and the dc capacitor. Because of the high efficiency brought by variable speed control, relatively low cost, and low-voltage ride-through capability, the DFIG is the most widely used type of wind generator so far.

B. Fault Studies

Consider the sample system of Fig. 16 from the point of view of line protection, especially regarding the current contribution from the wind generator. In order to obtain the proper transient response associated with the induction machine and its controller, the simulation included a detailed model for a 2 MW DFIG, including the wind turbine control and the induction machine vector control.

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Fig. 18 shows voltages and currents for a phase-to-phase fault at F1 (close-in fault). For this condition, none of the phase-to-ground voltages are considerably reduced, and therefore, the inverter-based source does not trigger its protective control circuits and may provide enough ac current for the distance and overcurrent elements to operate. However, the exact dynamic behavior of the source is not well known because it depends on the proprietary control logic of the DFIG. As a result, distance and overcurrent applications may still face some level of uncertainty not appreciated by most protection engineers.

Again, the 87L schemes work satisfactorily because the grid provides enough current contribution to effectively overshadow the DFIG currents, even if the latter display some unusual characteristics affecting the direction of the DFIG currents symmetrical components.

Fig. 19 illustrates the case of an SLG fault. This case is slightly different because now the wye-connected transformer acts as a source of the zero-sequence current. This is clearly visible with all three currents being of similar magnitude and phase. As a result, ground fault protection can often be provided with the use of ground directional overcurrent elements, or even ground distance elements.

Note that all three voltages collapse for this SLG fault. This is a consequence of the DFIG control system responding in a similar fashion as for the three-phase fault. Fig. 20 illustrates this by plotting the generator currents at the 20 kV winding of the transformer.

In general, inverter-based sources act as weak systems, and the interconnected line should be protected using known methods (such as weak infeed logic). The interconnection transformer should be selected with a proper winding configuration, such as wye-grounded-delta-wye or wye-grounded-delta, to provide a ground source allowing better ground fault protection.

The 87L scheme is the preferred choice for primary line protection when connecting the wind farms to the utility grid. The 87L schemes will reliably detect line and ground faults involving inverter-based sources by utilizing the fault current contribution from the grid.
VI. CONCLUSION

The line current differential protection principle is inherently secure. The phase (87LP) elements respond to phase currents, are often set above the maximum load currents, and are typically applied to clear heavy faults fast. The sequence (87LG and 87LQ) elements are very sensitive, may be slightly slower by design, and are typically applied to detect high-resistance faults.

All three elements (87LP, 87LQ, and 87LG) use the same measurements, are easy to set, and are inherently secure. Therefore, enabling all three elements does not diminish the security of the application, provided the CTs perform adequately (or the relay incorporates the means to secure these elements under CT saturation, such as EFD logic) and the line charging current is small (or the relay incorporates line charging current compensation).

This paper explains 87L dependability concerns for series-compensated lines, during power swings, during off-nominal frequencies, and with inverter-based short-circuit sources. These challenges are considerably less significant for 87L schemes as compared with any single-ended protection method.

Furthermore, any dependability concerns can be reduced or eliminated by applying all three 87L elements—87LP, 87LQ, and 87LG—in parallel.

VII. REFERENCES


VIII. BIOGRAPHIES

Yiyan Xue received his B.Eng. from Zhejiang University in 1993 and M.Sc. from the University of Guelph in 2007. He is currently a Senior Engineer in the P&C Standards Group of American Electric Power (AEP), working on protection standards, relay settings, fault analysis, and simulation studies. Before joining AEP, he was an Application Engineer with GE Multilin, providing consulting services on relay settings, scheme design, and RTDS studies. Prior to GE, he had ten years with ABB Inc., working on P&C system design, commissioning of relays, and RTU systems. He is a senior member of IEEE and a Professional Engineer registered in Ohio.

Bogdan Kasztenny is the R&D director of technology at Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. He has over 23 years of expertise in power system protection and control, including ten years of academic career and ten years of industrial experience, developing, promoting, and supporting many protection and control products.

Bogdan is an IEEE Fellow, Senior Fulbright Fellow, Canadian representative of CIGRE Study Committee B5, registered professional engineer in the province of Ontario, and an adjunct professor at the University of Western Ontario. Since 2011, Bogdan has served on the Western Protective Relay Conference Program Committee. Bogdan has authored about 200 technical papers and holds 20 patents.

Douglas Taylor received his BSEE and MSEE degrees from the University of Idaho in 2007 and 2009, respectively. Since 2009, he has worked at Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. and currently is a power engineer in research and development. Doug is a member of the IEEE and has authored several technical papers.

Yu Xia is an associate power engineer at Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. He received his B.S. degree from the University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui, in 2008. He is working on his doctor’s degree in power system engineering at the University of Idaho. His research of interest is power system protection. He was an intern at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Shanghai, in 2007. He has authored several technical papers.

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